We All Make Assumptions Part 1

Reblogged from doubtingmarcus

We All Make Assumptions Part 1

How do we know what’s real? What counts as evidence? Philosophers have been asking these questions for thousands of years and since none were available I’ve been asked to explain how I answer these questions. There are certain assumptions that underlie my epistemology, as they are with all epistemologies, but I was particularly asked how mine differ or are less circular than the assumptions that underlie Van Tillian presuppositionalism so I endeavor to do that here. Much of what I have to say about Van Tillian presuppositionalism I’ve already stated in my rebuttal to it as an argument for the existence of god and much of my epistemology will sound familiar to those who are fans of Evid3nc3 of Youtube, I can’t help that I largely agree with him.

However my particular choices as an empirical evidentialist (though strictly speaking its more a coherentist form of evidentialism) is not the main brunt of my distinction because it is not only the details my particular evidentialism that distinguish it from presuppositionalist arguments for gods but a difference in kind. As an evidentialist, though not in the strict W.K. Clifford universal sense, before I begin any pursuit of truth I must assume that:

I exist

My senses aren’t always wrong

Physical evidence is a way to justify beliefs

These are assumptions which I don’t take to be self-evident but the third assumption is the basis for actually attaining knowledge. This third claim is also open to revision or possible refutation and is not, I can’t emphasize this enough, an entire worldview but rather the means for constructing a worldview. It is also the basis for an argument that all justified beliefs are ultimately based physical evidence but that too is open to revision or refutation.

Presuppositionalists often like to point to the laws of thought and say that only a theist good could account for these “self-evident truths” but I reject the idea that there are even self-evident truths. Imagine for a moment we found ourselves as minds in a universe which either contained no distinct objects, everything was one amorphous entity, or in a universe of nothingness. In either scenario I can’t comprehend a way in which the law of identity could be abstracted because it is dependent upon there being at least two distinguishable items. Devoid of these distinctive objects it seems to me a mind could not abstract them and hence I believe logic has its basis in sense experience. The fact that the law of identity would still be true, even if not applicable in such universes, is not relevant because if it couldn’t be abstracted in any scenario it is obviously not a self-evident truth.

Similarly if we found ourselves in a universe devoid of all objects how could one abstract the idea of the law of non-contradiction? Without items to draw upon I see no conceivable way could a mind just abstract the idea of true or false statements (assuming for the sake of argument these aren’t necessarily human minds which are not in fact “blank slates” at birth). Again the fact that it would still be true that a statement can not both be true and false at the same time is not relevant. All that is relevant is that even this foundational aspect of logic is also dependent upon some sense experience.

There may be things which are objectively true in all realities but there are no “self-evident truths” which can be discovered purely by rational thought. Mathematics, the laws of logic, etc are abstractions and as such I believe they, like all claims of knowledge, ultimately stem from physical evidence. However I’m more than willing to admit that I could definitely be wrong about all of this but even if I am I think we’ll see that this type of epistemology and theory of justification is quite far removed from presuppositionalism.

Individual Sovereignty

We All Make Assumptions Part 1

Notes